Australia has accounted for over 51 percent of mergers and acquisitions in the Asia Pacific region (excluding Japan) during [2004][2005][2006]. This paper investigates the short-horizon and long-horizon wealth effects experienced by shareholders of Australian acquirers following these domestic and cross-border business takeover announcements. The sample consists of 197 announcements. Results for domestic acquisitions suggest that acquirers' shareholders endure abnormal returns in the range of -1.07% and -1.86% per day in the short-horizon. The long-horizon wealth effects, however, were found to be inconclusive. Results for cross-border acquisitions show that acquirers' shareholders endure abnormal returns in the range of 1.02% and 1.26% per day in the short-horizon. This positive wealth effect, however, dissipates in the long-horizon.
Introduction
The business takeover markets around the world have undergone unprecedented growth over the years. Factors such as the liberalisation of trade and capital movement, rapid technological change, advances in information technology, regulatory reform in utility sectors and government privatizations have helped fuel the acceleration of these takeover activities (OECD, 2001) .
Within this global trend, the Australian acquirers have played an increasingly important role. According to SDC Platinum (2008), Australia has accounted for over 51% of announced mergers and acquisitions (M&As) in the Asia Pacific region (excluding Japan) during [2004] [2005] [2006] . Also, the value of domestic M&As (DMAs) has increased four times and the value of cross-border M&As (CBMAs) has increased over twenty times during 1993 and 2006. Despite these developments, as far as it could be ascertained, no study has considered the wealth effects endured by shareholders of Australian acquirers following business takeover announcements. This study is an attempt to fill this research gap.
Specifically, we contribute to the literature by estimating both short-horizon and long-horizon wealth effects experienced by Australian acquirers (involving both DMAs and CBMAs) utilising a unique data set that has not been subject to a similar study. 1 Our sample comprises of 142 DMA announcements and 55 CBMA announcements made between January 1996 and December 2004. The short-horizon performance of acquirers is estimated over a three-day time window using the standard market model, which is the methodology adopted by large majority of studies. Our examination of long-horizon wealth effects, however, is conducted using the calendar-time methodology which is robust to most criticisms of previous long-horizon studies.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. The next section reviews the existing M&A wealth effects literature and states the hypotheses tested in the paper. The research design and the empirical models are in the third section, with the discussion of findings in the subsequent section. The last section concludes the paper.
Literature review and hypotheses 2.1
Short-horizon wealth effects endured by acquirers in DMAs Typically, acquirers engage in DMAs to take advantage of any synergistic benefits, cost savings or increased market share that may exist between the target and acquirer (Datta et al., 1992) . To advocates of the agency and management hubris theories, however, DMAs may in fact create negative wealth effects for the acquirer. For example, Shleifer and Vishny (1989) argue that some managers may encourage M&As to entrench themselves in the firm by investing in areas that make their specific skills indispensable, even if such projects do not add value. By doing so management may be able to enhance their remuneration and diminish the likelihood of being replaced. These ulterior motives may lead management to overestimate synergistic gains arising from a takeover, causing the company to overpay for the targets assets (Hayward and Hambrick, 1997) . High agency costs in terms of monitoring and bonding operations may also have an adverse effect on the acquirer's market value, if issues concerning the loss of control of the consolidated entity are perceived important by the market (Ravenscraft and Scherer, 1987) .
The empirical studies investigating the shorthorizon wealth effects to acquirers' shareholders in DMAs have produced contradictory evidence. For example, Eckbo and Thorburn (2000) find that Canadian domestic acquirers realised significant positive abnormal stock returns of 3.65%. Kang (1993) echoes a similar result for a sample of Japanese acquirers over 1975-1988. In contrast, Gregory (1997) shows significant negative abnormal returns using the same methodology and short-horizon event window as Eckbo and Thorburn (2000) . Kennedy and Limmack (1996) and Aw and Chatterjee (2004) also report results consistent with Gregory (1997) for UK acquirers. These contradictory evidence and inconsistencies warrant further investigations into the short-horizon wealth effects of DMAs endured by acquirers' shareholders. 2 
2.2
Short-horizon wealth effects endured by acquirers in CBMAs
The CBMAs, according to theorists of foreign direct investment, should create value for acquirers for three reasons: (1) through gaining access to the expertise and know-how of international markets (according to the internationalization theory of Buckley and Casson (2003) ), (2) through internalization of synergies based on intangible and information based assets such as economies of scale and scope that would otherwise be lost because of various market failures , and (3) through reduced risk of business failure due to greater income diversification (French and Poterba, 1991) . On the contrary, for agency and management hubris theorists, CBMAs in fact destroy value for the bidder to the extent these transactions are mere avenues for management to expand their empire overseas at the expense of shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) .
The empirical studies investigating the shorthorizon wealth effects to acquirers' shareholders in CBMAs have predominantly been on developed countries such as the U.S., the U.K. and Japan. 3 Their findings, however, remain contradictory. For example, a well-known study by Doukas 
Long-horizon wealth effects endured by acquirers in DMAs and CBMAs
The short-horizon wealth effect studies discussed above (involving both DMAs and CBMAs) assume perfect capital markets and contend that the shorthorizon stock price reaction to bid announcements was sufficient to capture the full information effect of the acquisition. The prior studies approximating long-horizon abnormal returns (over one to three years following merger announcements), however, question the interpretation of traditional shorthorizon event study results as a standalone analysis and advocate an additional examination of longhorizon shareholder wealth effects (Loughran and Vijh, 1997 We define a merger or acquisition as occurring when the acquirer owns less than 50% of the target's voting shares before the takeover announcement and increases its ownership to at least 50% of voting shares after the announcement. In addition, to be included in the sample, a particular M&A transaction should satisfy the following selection criteria: i)
acquirer is an Australian company listed on the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) and daily and monthly stock prices, monthly market capitalisation, and financial and accounting data for the acquirer are available in the AGSM data base, ii) acquisition involved a completed domestic or cross-border M&A transaction and transaction values were disclosed, iii) transaction value is greater than US$20 million (following, Bhagat et al., 1990) , and iv) the acquirer was not involved in any other M&As in the previous three years. This is because multiple acquisitions within the same time window studied raise the problem of dependent observations due to overlap and contamination of the sample (Andre et al., 2004) . 
Computing short-horizon abnormal returns
We estimate the short-horizon abnormal returns using the standard market model. This approach produces a smaller variance for abnormal returns leading to more powerful statistical tests than alternative constant mean return model, capital asset pricing model and the Fama-French three factor model (MacKinlay, 1997). Furthermore, this methodology has been used more extensively in previous literature than any other alternative and so ensures comparability of our results (for example see, Franks and Harris (1989); Cakici and Hessel (1996) ; and Eckbo and Thorburn (2000)).
The short-horizon abnormal returns are approximated by calculating the daily average abnormal returns (AARs), which are then used to determine cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs). The time window over which AARs and CAARs have been estimated differ significantly amongst similar studies with little consensus among researchers. For example, time windows vary from those beginning one day before the bid announcement date and ending one day after bid Danbolt, 2004) . Given that share prices are quick to adjust following M&A announcements, the most common definition of short-horizon used in literature is three days: oneday before bid announcement to one-day after the bid announcement. Thus, this definition of shorthorizon time window, which we denote as (-1, +1), is adopted in the present study to ensure greater comparability with prior studies. As robustness measures, however, we also compute abnormal returns over two other time windows: five days prior to bid announcement to five days after bid announcement (-5, +5) and ten days prior to bid announcement to ten days after bid announcement (-10, +10).
We calculate the daily returns for each acquirer in our sample over the time window (-131, +10), which represents the period from 131 days before the announcement date, to, 10 days after the announcement date (Cakici et al., 1996) . The first 120 days in this period (-131 through to -11) is designated as the estimation period (hereafter 'EP') and the following 21 days (-10 through to +10) is designated as the test period (hereafter 'TP'). The continuously compounded logarithmic returns are employed as opposed to arithmetic returns since the former is more likely to be normally distributed and so conform to the assumptions of standard statistical techniques. The daily returns are computed using Equation 1 below:
where, ln denotes natural logarithm and jt R = return on security j, at time t (days); For a sample of T firms, the daily average abnormal return (AAR) for each day t is then calculated using Equation 4 below:
In order to capture the effect of a takeover announcement on acquiring company share prices we calculate cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs) by accumulating AARs over the time window (-1, +1). Since we also employ wider time windows as robustness checks, CAARs are also calculated for (-5, +5) and (-10, +10) time windows. For the time window (-1, +1), the CAAR can be represented as:
Table 2 provides specific variable definitions employed in the calculation of CAARs as explained above. 
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Abnormal Returns
The abnormal return for security j at time t, where t is in days. Abnormal returns are calculated as the difference between expected return at time t, and actual return at time t over the three test periods (-10, +10), (-5, +5) and (-1, +1).
t AAR
Average Abnormal Returns
The average abnormal return at time t, where t is in days. Average abnormal returns are calculated as the average abnormal return experienced by all securities in the sample over the test period (-10, +10).
CAAR Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns
The cumulative average abnormal return calculated over the three time windows (-10, +10), (-5, +5) and (-1, +1). This is calculated as the sum of the average abnormal returns for each day in the particular time window.
Independent Variables
jt P
Share price
The share price of security j at time t; t is in days. This share price is required for over the time window (-131, +10).
The dividend paid by security j at time t-1, where t is in days.
The share price of security j at time t-1; t is in days. This share price is required for over the time window (-132, +9).
mt R
Return on All Ordinaries
The daily return from the ASX All Ordinaries Index at time t, which is used as a market proxy. Daily returns are required for over the time window (-131, +10).
To test hypotheses H 1 and H 2 we check whether CAARs for DMA and CBMA are significantly different from zero, respectively. To that end, the following test statistic as proposed by Kothari and Warner (1996) The null hypotheses of H 1 and H 2 will be rejected in favour of their respective alternative hypotheses if estimated CAARs are statistically different from zero for the DMA sample and CBMA sample, respectively. Kothari and Warner (1996) test statistic (given in Equation 6 ) is utilised to assess whether calculated CAARs are statistically different from zero.
Computing long-horizon abnormal returns
There are two established methods in the literature to measure long-horizon shareholder wealth effects: (1) the buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR) approach and (2) the calendar-time portfolios (CTAR) approach. According to Fama (1998) , the CTAR methodology dominates the BHAR approach for three important reasons. Firstly, the former is less susceptible to the 'bad model' problem that manifests itself within the BHAR approach. 4 Secondly, by forming monthly calendar-time portfolios, the CTAR approach automatically accounts for all cross-correlations in event-firm abnormal returns. Thirdly, the distribution of the CTAR abnormal returns estimator is better approximated by a normal distribution, allowing for classical statistical inference. This view is echoed by Mitchell and Stafford (2000) who argue that the CTAR methodology is more robust to critical statistical problems, and, it has more power to identify reliable evidence in event samples than the BHAR. Barber and Lyon (1997) and Kothari and Warner (1996) provide simulation evidence that biases arise from the BHAR approach producing questionable abnormal return estimates. Following this rationale, we utilise the CTAR approach for estimating the long-horizon abnormal returns for our sample of Australian acquirers.
We evaluate long-horizon abnormal returns for up to thirty-six months (+36) after the takeover announcement for each acquirer (Mitchell and Stafford, 2000) . The twelve-month (+12) and twenty four-month (+24) post-acquisition announcement abnormal returns are also used as robustness checks and to ensure comparability with similar studies (for example, Andre et al., 2004 . For each calendar month between January 1993 and December 2004 we form a value-weighted (hereafter 'VW') portfolio of Australian firms that made an M&A announcement within the preceding three years.
The value-weighted approach is employed due to the observed, skewed distribution of DMA and CBMA announcements in our sample.
Creating VW portfolios involves weighting the company-specific monthly abnormal returns by the market capitalization of the company in that particular month. Portfolios are rebalanced each month to drop all acquirers that reach the end of their 36 month period, and companies that have just announced a transaction are added to portfolios. By creating portfolios each calendar month between 1996 and 2007, we obtain a time-series of portfolio returns. As employed by Andre et al., (2004) , we require each event portfolio to have a minimum of five observations; otherwise that particular month is removed from the time-series of portfolio returns. Monthly-excess returns are then calculated by subtracting the 10-year Australian Treasury Bond rate (which is used to proxy the risk-free rate) from the monthly portfolio returns. We then regress monthly-excess returns on the Fama-French three factor model (Fama and French, 1993) as follows:
, ) ( The monthly portfolio excess-returns at time t, where t is in months. This is calculated as the excess return from the VW portfolios over the risk-free rate each month for (+36), (+24) and (+12).
Independent Variables α
Abnormal Returns
The average monthly abnormal returns to the sample of acquirers. This is calculated for portfolios estimating returns over (+36), (+24) and (+12).
mt R
Return on All Ordinaries The monthly return from the ASX All Ordinaries Index at time t, which is used as a market proxy. This is required for up to 36 months after the acquisition announcement.
ft R
Risk-free Return
The monthly 10-year Australian Government Bond rate at time t which is used as the risk-free rate. This is required for up to 36 months after the acquisition announcement.
T SMB
Size Factor
The monthly small-minus-big size factor at time t from the Fama-French three factor model. This is required for up to 36 months after the acquisition announcement.
t HML
Book-to-market Factor
The monthly high-minus-low book-to-market factor at time t from the Fama-French three factor model. This is required for up to 36 months after the acquisition announcement.
4.
Results and discussion 4.1 Short-horizon wealth effects Our results reveal further that Australian acquirers in DMAs incur the largest CAARs during the time window (-10, +10). This observation is consistent with similar recent studies, which also find that CAARs to acquirers increase when a wider time window is adopted (see, for example Eckbo and Thorburn (2000) and Goergen and Renneboog (2004) ).
The daily average abnormal returns (AARs) used to calculate the CAARs are reported in the Column 2 of Table 5 (for the DMA sample) as an additional robustness check. Arguably, the AAR of significant -0.60% on the day before the announcement can possibly be explained by the leakage of insider information before bid is actually announced to the market. An AAR on the day of the bid announcement of significant 0.65% indicates that the market overreacts and perceives the announcement as positive news initially. This is, however, followed by three consecutive days of market correction with significant negative AARs.
The Note: ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.
The short-horizon CAARs earned by Australian acquirers engaged in CBMAs (related to hypothesis 2 H ) are also given in Table 4 . Over the time window (-1, +1), bidders experienced a CAAR of 1.02% significant at the 1% level. The robustness of this finding is verified by the CAARs for time windows (-5, +5) and (-10, +10). We find statistically significant abnormal returns of 1.26% and 1.11% for the two time windows, respectively. Given the consistency of these results, we reject hypothesis 2 H . Put differently, our findings uniformly indicate that Australian acquirers' shareholders endure short-horizon significant abnormal returns following CBMA announcements.
The AARs used to calculate the CAARs for acquirers engaged in CBMA are presented in Column 3 of Table 5 as an additional robustness check. We observe that the acquirers perform well in the two days leading up to the bid, with significant positive ARRs. Furthermore, on the bid announcement date acquirers earn a significant 0.26%, followed by a significant 0.69% the day after the announcement. Positive abnormal returns on these days further suggest that the market perceives the acquisition of a cross-border target as positive news and adjusts the share price of the acquirer accordingly. +1 ). These finding support our conclusion that shareholders of acquirers in CBMA endure positive wealth effects in the short-horizon.
Long-horizon wealth effects
The long-horizon abnormal returns endured by Australian acquirers engaged in DMA (related to hypothesis 3 H ) are presented in Overall, shareholders of Australian acquirers engaged in DMA incur significant wealth losses in the short-horizon. Our results do not provide clear evidence to show whether if expected synergies from DMAs are realised or not by the acquirer in the long-horizon. With respect to CBMAs, shorthorizon results show that shareholders earn significant positive abnormal returns. However, our findings of long-horizon wealth effects are against foreign direct investment theories that suggest acquirers in CBMAs can earn positive abnormal returns by taking advantage of differences in capital factor markets. Instead, results for CBMA argue in favour of agency and management hubris theories implying that CBMAs may merely enable empire building by management, destroying value for the acquiring company shareholders.
Conclusion
This paper investigated the short-horizon and longhorizon wealth effects endured by shareholders of Australian acquirers engaged in DMAs and CBMAs. The sample consisted of 197 business takeover announcements. As far as it could be ascertained, this is the first study to estimate both short-horizon and long-horizon wealth effects experienced by Australian acquirers involved in DMAs and CBMAs.
Overall, results indicate that acquirers in DMAs endure significant negative abnormal returns in the three-days surrounding bid announcements. The long-term wealth effects (represented by 12-, 24-and 36-month time windows), however, do not consistently show whether expected synergies from takeover activity are realised by the Australian acquirers in the longhorizon. In contrast, CBMA announcements resulted in significant positive wealth effects for Australian acquirers in the three-days surrounding bid announcements. In the three years following CBMA announcements, however, acquirers endured significant negative abnormal returns. This finding suggests that in the short-horizon investors perceive CBMA announcements positively, but in the long-horizon acquirers are unable to realise the benefits of international diversification. Hence our results argue against foreign direct investment theories that suggest acquirers in CBMA can earn positive abnormal returns by taking advantage of differences in capital factor markets. Instead, the findings point in favour of agency and management hubris theories implying that CBMA activity may merely be a part of empire building by management, destroying value for the acquiring company shareholders.
Given that Australian acquirers accounted for over 51% of announced mergers and acquisitions in the Asia Pacific region (excluding Japan) during 2006, our findings present important implications. The Australian stock market (ASX) investors (both institutional and individual) should find this research of use when assessing their investments in listed companies that make M&A announcements. For instance, in the short-horizon, investors may be inclined to hold companies involved in CBMAs but then liquidate their investments before the longhorizon negative wealth effects set in. Investors should also consider readjusting their portfolios in line with short-horizon negative wealth effects following DMA announcements. For the managers, our findings appear as an 'eye opener' and provide quantitative evidence on the negative wealth effects of M&A transactions. Arguably, our results highlight the importance of conducting orderly and scientific examination of takeover targets prior to announcing business takeover intentions. In other words, managers should ensure that business takeovers add value to their shareholders. Finally, the regulators should implement guidelines to ensure sufficient information disclosure regarding M&A announcements so that market participants can make informed decisions.
Based on the key limitations of this research, we suggest following avenues for future research. The present study could be extended by considering the alternative BHAR methodology to verify the long-horizon wealth effect estimates obtained in this study using the calendar-time approach. Another possible extension is to investigate the possible firm-specific and macroeconomic determinants of short-horizon and long-horizon wealth effects endured by shareholders of Australian acquirers.
